Russell's philosophy and politics

by John Dewey

In March, 1920, John Dewey delivered in Peking a series of six lectures on three contemporary philosophers. They were James, Bergson and Russell, and Dewey dealt with them in that order. The lectures were published only in the Chinese of Dewey's interpreter and recorders, as **Five Major Lecture Series of John Dewey in Peking** *(Peking: Morning Post, 1920). We are printing the two lectures on Russell, both because Dewey did not write elsewhere on these topics in Russell, and because they are excellent summaries by an outstanding philosopher. We are able to do so through the generous permission of the translators, Robert W. Clopton and Tsuin-chen Ou, who recently published* **John Dewey's Lectures in China, 1919-1920** *(Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1973). Their book includes an appendix listing the lectures which they translated but decided not to reprint, and which they have made available to researchers at the Sinclair Library, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822. The translations read so well that we hope people of similar ability will be found to translate Russell's Chinese lectures.*

The lecture titles have been supplied by the editor. In the first paragraph Dewey unaccountably states that Russell "resigned" his Cambridge position during the war. Actually Russell was fired, or, as administrators would put it, he lacked tenure and his appointment was not renewed. See G.H. Hardy, **Bertrand Russell and Trinity**.

Lecture V. Russell's philosophy

This evening we will talk about the third of the philosophers with whom we are dealing in this series of lectures, Bertrand Russell, a young Englishman. A few years ago Russell was a professor of mathematics at Cambridge University, but because of his pacifism he incurred the displeasure of the British government when the European War broke out, and he resigned his professorship until the end of the war. Today we will talk about the theoretical aspects of Russell's philosophy, leaving consideration of his ethics and political philosophy for our next lecture.

It would be difficult to find another philosopher so entirely different from both James and Bergson as Russell is. As we have seen, James and Bergson share many points in common, but so far as the theoretical aspects of philosophy are concerned, Russell does not share a single point with either of them. Both James and Bergson base their philosophy in psychology, and begin their inquiries with consideration

of human affairs, with the concerns of conscious, living human beings. Russell, on the other hand, starts with mathematics, the most abstract and formal of the sciences. He distrusts psychology, deeming it to be not only irrelevant to philosophy, but a source of confusion which impedes the systematization of philosophy.

Because Russell insists that knowledge must be universal, and that it can never be purely personal, he abjures psychology on the ground that its utilization in philosophy would obviate universality. Russell tells us that the reason mathematics has not earlier been used as a basis for philosophy is that it was not until recent years that mathematics was sufficiently developed to serve this purpose. But he is sure that now man has developed mathematics to a sufficiently high degree to warrant its employment as the foundation of philosophical method.

There is one point at which the philosophy of Russell resembles that of James, although this may not be particularly significant, and this is that both are pluralists. I'm sure that you know that some philosophies are pluralistic, and others monistic. A pluralistic philosopher refuses to try to embrace all reality under a single principle, while on the other hand the monistic philosopher does. James, with his great emphasis on individuality, takes the individual as the central point from which experience is to be considered, and he is thus a pluralistic philosopher. In this particular respect, Russell's basic position is like that of James, and we can also call him a pluralist.

In his writings Russell designates his philosophy "logical atomism" or "absolute pluralism." In espousing a pluralistic view, Russell points out that pluralism does not admit of the concept of a single, unitary universe, a concept which was generally accepted prior to the development of modern astronomy. For centuries people had thought of the earth as the centre of the universe, with the sun, moon, and stars revolving about it. But the work of Copernicus rendered this concept untenable, and now astronomy has developed to the point at which it is no longer possible to think in terms of a single universe.

At this point I must make one thing clear: since Russell's philosophy is so completely founded in mathematics, which is a highly specialized area of inquiry, it would be impossible for me to give anything like an adequate introduction to it, or even a coherent outline of it, within the scope of these two popular lectures. This evening I am not going to talk about the content of Russell's philosophy at all; instead, I have chosen to discuss with you some of Russell's criticisms of other schools of philosophy, in the hope that this somewhat negative approach will suggest to you the general outlines of his own position.

Russell sees two fundamental mistakes in traditional philosophy: first, it undertook to establish the existence of a unified universe, and

to subsume all reality under one principle; and second, it has been unduly influenced by religion and ethics, and has undertaken to explain the universe by use of religious and ethical terminologies. Most such philosophies have attributed inherent goodness to the universe, and have assumed that this goodness is an aspect of reality.

Many religiously oriented philosophers have utilized their religious beliefs as they have dealt with the universe or with reality; they have worked from the assumption that the universe is basically good, and that life is worth living. Even those philosophers who have rejected religion have been, at times without being aware of it, influenced by ethical and moral considerations. For example, even the evolutionists have interpreted the evolution of the universe in terms of moral concepts, presenting evolution as a process of transforming evil into good, into better. Russell rebukes both Spencer and Bergson for their resort to moral concepts in their explanations of evolution, and blames both for trying to explain reality in terms of what they consider to be "the better".

According to Russell not only has the progress of astronomy undermined the concept of a single, unified universe; it has also vitiated all attempts to explain the universe in terms of ethical concepts. In the past, when people thought that the earth was the centre of the universe, and that man was the centre of the earth, and when they regarded religion and ethics as central to human existence, it was no more than natural for them to conclude that religion and ethics were of equally central importance to the entire universe. What men did was to take the criteria by which they judged their own lives, and extend these to apply to the universe as they conceived it. But now modern astronomy has made us aware of the fact that the earth is no more than a small point in the solar system, and that man is only a trivial object on the earth. How, then, Russell asks, can man's religion and his ethical systems hold any status in the universe?

After the outbreak of the European War, Russell became greatly discouraged about the prospects for world culture. In one of his articles he develops the idea of the unimportance of man in reference to the universe; that in this small portion, the solar system is no more than a small black point, and that in this small point, the earth and the other planets could not be seen except through a microscope, and even under the microscope they would still be infinitesimal. On one of these infinitesimal points, the earth, incredibly tiny beings, composed of gas and water, busily and continually dart hither and yon, trying to extend the brief period of their lives, and killing other similar beings in their efforts to do so. Compared with the sun, man's life is brief indeed. But if they could be observed by beings on other worlds, those beings

would hope that men could hasten their own destruction by killing each other.

Russell insists that men must discard their prejudices and biases before they can develop a worthwhile philosophy. For him, philosophy is a matter of pure reason; it is speculative and is not related in any way with behaviour, but is concerned only with a true knowledge of the universe. Among the sciences, only mathematics is sufficiently detached from mundane concerns, sufficiently close to pure reason, to serve as the foundation for a rational philosophy. Russell says that philosophy cannot start with the results obtained by science, but that it must utilize scientific methodology. The purest and most accurate of the sciences is mathematics; hence the method of mathematics must become the method of philosophy. The objects of psychology and physics and the other sciences are existential, that is, they each exist as an object; but mathematics has nothing to do with existence. Dealing with the most abstract and universal formulae, it transcends existence. This is why the method of mathematics must be the method of philosophy.

Russell sees psychology and physics and the other sciences as being concerned with individual objects, not with universal and abstract common principles. Mathematics, on the other hand, is concerned only with the most universal and the most abstract formulae, with principles which can be applied in all fields of inquiry independently of the restrictions imposed by concrete individual objects. True knowledge can be sought only through application of the most universal and most abstract common principles - principles which apply only to the existence of truth, without reference to their own existence as principles. Since philosophy is to be applied to the universals, its principles cannot be either verified or disproved by empirical experience. Empirical experience is materialistic; but the laws of philosophy are universal in character. These principles are eternal, no matter how much or how often the world changes. Thus only the principles of mathematics and logic can be the foundations of philosophy.

Russell takes this concept to an extreme. He even equates "love" and "hate". What he really means, of course, is that these two concepts seem to have important differences in our experience of them, but when they are subjected to logical or philosophical examination, they turn out to be relative to, rather than opposed to, each other.

There is one thing about Russell's philosophy which is strange. In its ethical and social aspects it is quite radical, and fairly consistent with democracy; while in its theoretical aspects it smacks of authoritarianism appropriate to an aristocracy. Russell exalts reason and ignores perception; he emphasizes common principles and depreciates the individual object; he assigns to reason a much higher status than he accords to experience. His philosophy in this respect resembles rationalism. This is a strange phenomenon; there is no other philosopher whose theoretical considerations reflect the outlook of artistocracy while at the same time his practical considerations are so close to the democratic ideal.

Why do we compare this attitude with that of the aristocracy? It is simply that some people are impatient with the practical affairs of life, and seek to raise themselves above mundane considerations and enter a sphere of pure reflection. Such people feel that they are "artistic", and that they belong to a higher order of being than the run of common man. It is not difficult to see that the theoretical aspects of Russell's philosophy are characterized by this tendency.

In one of his articles in which he extols the merit of pure mathematics, and deals with the distinction between the practical life of man and his ideal life, Russell avers that the most one can hope for in a practical life is some sort of adjustment between the ideal on the one hand, and what is possible on the other. But in the world of pure reason, no such adjustment is needed; there is nothing to limit development or to stand in the way of continuing increment of creative activity and noble aspiration. This world of pure reason is far above all human desiring; it is immeasurably beyond the impoverished phenomena of nature; there man can construct a systematic universe for himself and dwell therein in perfect peace. There human freedom can be realized, and the sufferings of practical existence be known no more.

In Russell's more popular works we see evidence of his pessimism, amounting at times to anguish. He compares human life to a long journey in the dark, during which the traveller is beset on all sides with perils. Fatigued and tortured, man strives forward toward a destination which he knows not, and has small hope of reaching; and should he reach it, he can pause only a short time before having to resume his travels. This sort of pessimism is not infrequent in philosophy, particularly in philosophies formulated by philosophers who insist that the world of common principles must necessarily transcend the world of individual experience.

In an earlier lecture I noted that James takes the individual object as the most important and precious aspect of existence, and we may wonder why so many other philosophers accord priority to common principles. Russell's disposition is just the opposite of James'. Russell sees the universal principle as a haven of safety for man, as the ultimate and noblest goal toward which man may strive. At the same time that he acquiesces in the mystic's concept of time as an unimportant and superficial aspect of the reality, he tells us that man's first step through the door of wisdom is just to learn to find truth in the consideration of time as unimportant and superficial.

I cannot at this time deal with the details of Russell's philosophy. I have been talking chiefly about his attitude toward and his criticisms of other philosophies. It has been said that no more than twenty people in the whole world really understand mathematical philosophy - and I readily admit that I am not one of those twenty! There is one point, though, that can be discussed here. The natural sciences are means of dealing with individual objects through reference to common principles. By "common principle" in this connection we mean the scientific laws and principles by means of which we gain an understanding and grasp of our environment, even though the laws themselves are abstract and universal. The object toward which scientific endeavour is directed is the individual fact. How can science relate the two - interpret the individual fact in accordance with universal principle?

One answer to this problem is offered in modern idealism (which is to be distinguished from classic idealism). The Irish philosopher, Berkeley, held that true knowledge of the external world is nothing more than perception, and that what perception consists of is no more than sensation. For example, we see the candle as having a white light and a black wick, and when we touch it, we can tell that it is soft and greasy. A combination of these perceptions becomes our sensation, and constitutes our whole knowledge of the candle. Over and above this, there may exist a "reality" of the candle, but this is not to be known to the human intelligence; and even if it is there, it is of no concern to us. Knowledge is the combination of our various sensations; there is no call for us to concern ourselves with the problem of whether reality exists or whether it doesn't.

In one sense it seems that the progress of the natural sciences lends support to this concept. We now say that the reality of material things is actually the motion of the atoms and molecules which constitute them, and that all their characteristics are the results of such motion. But the idealist denies the reality of the material object, arguing that atoms and molecules are constructs of the human mind, and that as effects produced by our intentional and psychological assumptions, they are wholly subjective. In making these remarks, I have no intention of raising the old problem of mind and matter; my purpose is only to locate the point of dispute. Russell also explains the relationship between the scientist's atoms and molecules on the one hand, and the existence of the individual object on the other, telling us that this relationship is subject to mathematical formulation.

Russell recognizes that the object of perception is only the beginning point of our knowledge, but he is not an idealist. His approach to the problem is similar to that of Leibnitz (1646-1716) who devised the concept of the monad. The sensation of each person is a matter of

that person's point of view, and each such sensation has its own reality. With each monad having its own point of view, each person has his own private universe.

Russell holds that since the object of perception is dependent upon the point of view of the individual, and since no two persons ever have identical points of view, their perceptions may be quite different, the one from the other. But Russell permits perception to indicate real existence. For example, when we look at the table from the top, we get a perception which differs from the one we get when we look at it from underneath; but still, no two persons ever have exactly the same perception of the table. Russell would say that there is not just one table, but as many tables as there are persons perceiving it. Each person has his own table, so to speak. As with Leibnitz's monad, since each person has his own point of view, each also has his own universe. Mathematics and science function as means of communication. Insofar as your table can be demonstrated to be the same as his, a systematic universe can begin to be organized. In fact, since each person does have his own universe, the only means of communication possible to us come from logic, the sciences, and mathematics.

Bergson wrote an article in which he contends that it is not possible for human intelligence to encompass reality, change, and duration. He insists that intelligence cuts reality into segments, as the motion picture camera takes pictures of objects in movements in separate "frames", each of which is actually a still photograph. When Bergson drew this analogy, Russell had never seen a motion picture; but after reading Bergson's article, he did go to see one, and came away agreeing with Bergson that the motion picture camera had indeed divided reality into segments.

But we must also note that although Russell agrees that Bergson's description is accurate, what he means by "dividing into segments" is just the opposite of what Bergson means. Bergson insists that reality is continuous and changing, and that the separate segments are unreal; Russell, on the other hand, sees the movement as misleading, and the segments as real. Each individual object has its own existence; each individual has his own world. This is why Russell calls himself an "absolute pluralist". Reality is segmented, not continuous as Bergson contends. It is only through application of abstract laws that man can organize these segments of reality into a continuous universe. The construction of a universe is the function of science; the universe was not originally continuous. This is rugged individualism with a vengeance!

In our next and final lecture, we will talk about Russell's ethics and his political philosophy.

Lecture VI. Russell's ethics and political philosophy

We mentioned in our last lecture that the theoretical aspects of Russell's philosophy differ markedly from the practical aspects. This difference is accounted for by the rigid distinctions which Russell draws between reason and experience, between knowledge and activity, and between the common principle and the individual fact. These distinctions are responsible for the sharp divergence between the theoretical aspects of his philosophy and the social aspects.

These distinctions had led Russell to apply sharply different emphases to the theoretical aspects of his philosophy on the one hand, and to the practical and social aspects on the other. When dealing with the theoretical aspect, Russell subjects human knowledge to fact, and argues that man can have only a speculative view of and a spectator's attitude toward fact - something comparable to the mirror which reflects objects as though the reflected objects were real. But when he deals with practical and social matters, Russell's philosophy is of quite another sort; he depreciates the existent individual fact, and emphasizes such concepts as creation, growth, change, and transformation.

When he deals with theoretical matters, Russell takes a dim view of impulse; but impulse takes on considerable importance when he directs his philosophical inquiry toward human behaviour - an importance comparable to that of *elan vital* in Bergson's philosophy. Russell is not willing to let impulse intrude where knowledge is concerned for fear that it might disturb the quietude of knowledge; but he recognizes the importance of impulse when he deals with practical concerns. In fact, he makes it the basis of human behaviour.

We cannot at this moment enter into a detailed discussion of the question of whether these such sharply divergent positions on theoretical matters and on practical matters constitute a logical contradiction; nor can we go into detail about the questions of whether, or how, his theoretical philosophy has influenced his practical philosophy. We can only summarize the main points of his social philosophy. The difference between Russell's theoretical philosophy and his social and practical philosophy is not merely a matter of differing content, but is reflected in vastly different styles of writing. His writing in theoretical philosophy, with its style drawn from mathematics, is very difficult to understand; but when he deals with practical philosophy, he employs a popular style which great numbers of readers find most attractive.

The three basic works in which Russell presents his social philosophy are *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, *Political Ideals*, and

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Roads to Freedom. All three of these books were written after the outbreak of the European War, and it can be said that all of them are, directly or indirectly, influenced by the war. When the war broke out, Russell was aghast, and viewed the war as a result of the combined evil powers of man - his power to destroy, his power to detract from the meaning of life, and his power to obstruct the development and creation of life. To combat such evil powers, Russell pleads for the rapid development of man's creative and progressive abilities. This advocacy is the central theme of his social philosophy.

A word must be added here: twenty-four years ago, in 1896, Russell published his *German Social Democracy*, at a time when interest ran high in the work of Karl Marx, and in the development of social democratic theory. Russell's book was chiefly factual and historical, but it affords evidence that even that long ago he was vitally interested in social problems.

When we compare the theoretical aspects of Russell's philosophy with what he has to say about social and practical problems, we note that the theoretical aspect is based on mathematics as a universal science, and that it depreciates individual psychology as being irrelevant; but when he deals with practical matters, psychology assumes a basic and important role. In fact, Russell holds that all institutions have originated to meet psychological needs, and, even further, that these institutions cannot be adequately explained without reference to instincts. He not only erects his theories on psychological bases, but resorts to psychology as the criterion by which institutions are to be criticized, to determine which arouse higher impulses and which suppress the higher impulses and encourage the baser ones.

Russell sees human psychology as having three components: first, instinct; second, mind; and third, spirit. The parts of life which fall in the sphere of instinct include all natural impulses such as self-defence, hunger, thirst, and sex; and when we extend the concept of reproduction, the family and the state. In short, instinct is the sphere in which is determined the success or failure of the individual career, and of the family and the state. It is the part of life which we inherit from the lower animals. The life of the mind is different from the life of instinct, in that the latter is personal, while the former is impersonal. Through the life of the mind, man disregards his own benefits or sufferings, and strives to attain universal knowledge.

Russell's concept of spirit somewhat resembles his concept of mind, in that both transcend the individual aspects of life. But he has the life of the mind transcending individual knowledge, while life of the spirit transcends individual feeling. The life which has feeling at its center finds fruition in the fine arts and in religion. The fine

arts being in instinct and ascend to feeling, while religion, arising in feeling, gradually seeps down to permeate the life of instinct.

For Russell, the ideal development is one in which these three elements are in balance. Instinct infuses us with energy; knowledge provides us with method; and spirit directs us toward purpose. When energy, method, and purpose are coordinate, a man is at his best. But such a condition is rare in ordinary life; all too often we sacrifice two of the elements in our efforts to develop a third. When we sacrifice mind and spirit for excessive development of the life of instinct, we live the life of savages. When our effort to satisfy desire is not sufficiently informed by knowledge, we are barbarians, not civilized people. And when the life of the mind becomes too critical of the life of instinct, we become sceptics; we distrust the world; we lose the enthusiasm which only instinct can generate, become coldly critical and detached, and eventually withdraw from the world of action.

Russell tells us that man has developed the life of the mind to such an extreme that the necessity has arisen for schools of philosophy which might come to the rescue and help him coordinate the parts that make up the whole. Among such schools of philosophy Russell includes James' Pragmatism and Bergson's Vitalism, both of which we have discussed in earlier lectures in this series. But Russell rejects both approaches, because he says that they are merely trying to adjust mind to instinct. He accuses them of having tried to make knowledge subordinate to instinct.

Russell holds that man should be characterized by universal feeling, so that he will not be confined and restricted by consideration of his own welfare, or the welfare of his family or his state. Instead, a man should be concerned with the welfare of all mankind, and direct all his efforts toward the promotion of this general welfare.

Russell lays upon social institutions the onus of individual man's inability to develop himself to the fullest. Such obstruction and suppression of individual development, however, is not of fundamental importance; not matter how great influence social institutions can wield, they cannot take away a man's internal freedom. Far more dreadful is social temptation and bribery. For example, an artist may have tremendous potential for artistic creation, but society subjects him to its control with money and the promise of fame, so that he dare not create according to his own vision, but succumbs, and ends up by pandering to the prevailing tastes of his society - and, in so doing, is less than he might have been. The case is no different with the writer, or with the politician. Russell seems to distrust the politician most of all; in his opinion there is no politician who does not prostitute himself to the whims of his constituency, and who, even after he surrenders his integ-

rity, does not continue to subordinate his principles to the wishes of those whom he serves. Because these tactics of temptation and bribery, of buy men's souls, can and do stifle internal freedom beyond the possibility of resuscitation, they are more to be dreaded than forces which merely oppose or seek to suppress individual freedom.

But how, Russell asks, do such temptations and bribery, such purchase of man's soul, manage to obstruct the development of his individual freedom? Because social organization impairs the creative impulse and fosters the possessive impulse. Human activities fall into two categories, the creative and the possessive; and each is the manifestation of impulses which are creative or possessive. One cannot have such material goods as clothing, food, and other objects, and at the same time allow others to possess them. The impulse to ownership of such goods is possessive. The scientist, on the other hand, when he discovers a new scientific law, or discerns a hitherto undiscovered relationship, has no concern with the way the discovery may affect him as an individual, but immediately shares his discovery through publication. His impulse is creative. But social organizations encourage man's possessive impulse, and stifle his creative impulse.

This categorization of human impulses into the creative and the possessive is basic in Russell's social philosophy. In fact, we can say that his whole social philosophy is no more than the elaboration and application of this concept. He uses it as a criterion against which to judge social institutions, and by means of which to determine which should be cultivated and which controlled. He takes exception both to state ownership of property and to private ownership. Both these institutions are indispensable to the operation of our society as it now exists, but Russell objects that both foster the possessive impulse. To put it simply, Russell takes the central ideas of socialism and anarchism, and combines them into one concept which forms the basis of his advocacies. He says, for example, that when the possession of property is accorded central importance, the state, in protecting private ownership, helps the rich to become richer, and suppresses the poor. Extending this principle from its internal affairs to its international relations, the state lends its power to the suppression of small states, and thus contributes to the growth of imperialism.

As we have already said, the European War convinced Russell that war is an evil, a manifestation of the power to destroy. For him, war demonstrates the bankruptcy of both institutions, state ownership of property and private ownership. Private ownership, with its inherent competition in both industry and commerce, has promoted colonialism and fostered the development of imperialism. Further, the state as an institution, by protecting private ownership, vitiates individual free-

dom and reason, and subjects the individual to the control of and suppression by national power. As far as Russell is concerned, the European War was an irrefutable demonstration of the deficiencies inherent in both state and private ownership of property.

Aside from these two institutions, Russell says that the institutions of education, the family, the religion should have fostered the development of creative impulses, but that, in cold fact, they have failed to do so. It is not so much that such institutions are not by nature capable of fostering creative impulses as it is that they have become contaminated with possessive impulses, and have come so completely under their sway that they have fallen into decadence. Education should be a process of adventure and invention. It should be creative. But, instead, it has become an agent for possessiveness. Infiltration of the educative process by the institution of property has imposed shackles which prevent the free development of education. Thus education has degenerated into preservation of the status quo. The aim of the school as it now exists has become that of making the individual obedient and complaisant, of rendering him unquestioningly subject to the controls and regulations which surround him. Education is no longer concerned, as it ought to be, with the free development of creative impulses.

Russell charges that existing educational institutions aim not at the cultivation of thought, but rather at the cultivation of belief. Why should this be? Because education, as an institution, has been subordinated to the institution of property, and the educator is afraid that independent thought might create disturbances which would threaten property rights. Creative education should be a matter of adventure; but Russell claims that man fears thought more than anything else in the world, even more than he fears death and destruction. Thought is persistent; it is reforming; it is destructive; critical thought ignores privilege, power, existing institutions and comfortable habits; it is anarchic; it recognizes no authority and fears no law; it is great; it is quick; it is free, it enlightens the world; it is the ultimate honor of man. Creative education should not limit itself to the preservation of the past; it should aim at the creation of a better future.

Russell brings his fundamental concept of creative and possessive impulses to bear not only on existing institutions, but on programmes of social reconstruction as well. He has commented critically on all such programmes that he has been able to find, and finds fatal flaws in all of them. His criticism of socialism is that it is primarily a philosophy of economics. He sets forth four criteria by which we should measure any industrial institution: first, does it provide a maximum of production? second, does it foster a fair system of distribution? third, does it

accord workers reasonable treatment? and fourth (the most important), does it accelerate material and spiritual development, and bring about progress and enrichment? If an industrial institution satisfies only the first criterion, then we have over-production and our economy goes out of kilter. Socialism satisfies this criterion, and the second and third as well, but it has not yet progressed to the point of satisfying the fourth.

For another thing, when socialism is put into practice, the state as an institution must be strengthened. Russell derogates the institution of the state, blaming it for suppressing the individual and impeding his free development.

We have already talked about the negative aspects of Russell's philosophy in general. The constructive elements of his philosophy are not so much ideas which he has developed independently as they are combinations of ideas drawn from various schools of socialism. For example, he favours public ownership of the land, of mining, and of transportation facilities, and strongly supports cooperatives both for producers and consumers. He has written in support of the guild system in industry and commerce, and in advocacy of full autonomy for professional groups. For Russell the state is no more than a judge which safeguards the rights of the people; and he says that there should be a federal government above the state to restrain it from using its power in ways contrary to the general good.

These three contemporary philosophers, James, Bergson, and Russell represent the spirit of our time, both in their books and in the influence they have had on public opinion. Russell appears to differ from the other two, but when we examine matters closely we find that the difference is quite superficial. We find that Russell's philosophy about the state and about society is not essentially different from that of James and Bergson. Russell joins forces with them in the importance he attaches to creation, growth, change, and transformation. Even though Russell criticizes James for subordinating the life of instinct to the affairs of practical living, he himself incorporates universal feeling into knowledge. But James is more sophisticated than Russell, for while Russell takes mankind as a whole as the subject of his observations, James gives his attention to the individual person. James has consistently refused to concern himself with the concept of mankind in the abstract, and has devoted himself entirely to the life of the individual as an individual.

To conclude, each of these three philosophers has made his own contribution. James develops the concept of a dependable future which is active and flexible, and which can be freely created by those who live in it; his radical liberalism is a philosophy which invites each

man to create his own future world. This is James' contribution. Bergson's emphasis on intuition adds an element of freshness to this creation of one's own future, especially when he insists that it is not a matter of rationalizing or calculating, but comes as a result of our innate impulse to forward striving. This is Bergson's contribution. Russell develops the idea of broad and universal knowledge which is not subject to the limitations of the thinking of individuals; and tells us how such knowledge can supplement intuition, so that man can give direction to his forward striving. This is Russell's contribution.